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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have frequently noted the similarities between interpreting
scripture and interpreting law, especially interpreting a constitution.' There
are, of course, significant differences as well. The field of "biblical" her-
meneutics-theories of interpretation-has a long history, as does the field
of legal hermeneutics. Moreover, much has been written on the relationship
between religious interpretation and legal interpretation.2
This Essay is not meant to provide even a basic overview of these rich
and diverse fields of inquiry. Rather, the focus is on some of the vexing
problems facing those who utilize what this Essay refers to as "dogmatic"
approaches to interpreting religion or law.3 The focus here will be on bibli-
cal interpretation and constitutional interpretation. Specifically, I will com-
pare biblical literalism with textualism and originalism. As will be seen,
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
I. Some examples of excellent articles addressing this include, Thomas C. Grey,
The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Howard Lesnick, The Conscious-
ness of Religion and the Consciousness of Law, With Some Implications for Dialogue, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 335 (2006); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason:
A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amendment, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447 (1996); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988) (comparing religious and constitutional interpretation in the context of a broader
discussion-'"civil religion").
2. See supra note I and accompanying text; infra Parts I and III.
3. See infra Part I.
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these approaches suffer from problems of translation both figuratively and
literally (in the case of biblical literalism in the United States).
I. DRIFTING UNREFLECTIVELY THROUGH LANGUAGE AND TIME: THE JOYS
OF DOGMATISM
Biblical literalism is highly problematic unless one reads ancient He-
brew (old testament), Greek, and/or Aramaic (new testament). Claiming to
take the words of the bible literally without being fluent in these languages
is like claiming to take every word of a work of complex Greek philosophy
literally without understanding Greek. Translations are not perfect even
when translators use their best efforts. Some translations, such as the King
James Bible, are even more problematic because they also served a political
function.'
Even if one could literally translate from one language into another
without losing, changing, or augmenting meaning, the problems of cultural
and historical shifts remain.' When one claims to take the words of the bi-
ble literally, one not only ignores the problem of translation from language
to language, but also the problem of dasein (being in the world).' We are
the products of our traditions and cultural embeddedness. When we try to
understand historical texts we tend to bring them forward to our time and/or
attempt to put ourselves back into the period when they were written. Yet,
we did not live in that time or culture, and it is hard to escape our horizon
(view of the world) when we engage with the text.9 Therefore, we may fail
to consider accurately what the words meant in the culture and time when
they were written."o
Of course, many theologians have long recognized this and many
faiths are not literalist in the sense of taking every word of holy texts to be
literally true without the need for interpretation." These theologians under-
stand that even literalists are interpreting. Literalists sometimes don't real-
ize or acknowledge that they are doing so, but they cannot escape interpret-
4. See BENSON BOBRICK, WIDE AS THE WATERS: THE STORY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE
AND THE REVOLUTION IT INSPIRED (2001).
5. See infra Part II.
6. HAlw-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 257-64 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Continuum 2d rev. ed. 1999) (2003) [hereinafter GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD].
7. Id.
8. FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 2-6, 9-11, 81-82 (2007).
9. Id. at 9-11, 81-82.
10. Id. at2-6,9-11,81-82.
11. In fact, the number of faiths and denominations that acknowledge interpretation
occurs in understanding and applying religious texts far outnumber those that do not.
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ing holy texts (or interpreting generally).12 One way to address this is the
recognition by some Protestant theologians that if one is sufficiently con-
nected to Jesus one can understand the teaching in the bible despite these
linguistic, cultural and historical voids." The problem here is that many
who claim to be sufficiently connected to Jesus and to interpret the text lit-
erally disagree with each other as to its meaning. There is no Archimedean
point from which we can say, from outside a given tradition, that person X
has the real Jesus in her heart and therefore her understanding is the correct
one.14
Many religions and religious individuals understand this and eschew
biblical literalism in favor of more complex biblical hermeneutics (theories
of interpretation). These religions generally take holy texts quite seriously,
but they understand that interpretation is part of understanding any text.
Moreover, some of these faiths are especially wary of human claims to take
the words of holy texts literally, given that these texts are generally consi-
dered to have been authored by, or inspired by, the divine. This raises ob-
vious problems with assuming, or even understanding, what we might call
the intent of the framer. These faiths take the task of interpretation serious-
ly, and methodically try to understand holy texts." Whether they are correct
in their interpretations is irrelevant to the present discussion. The key is that
they understand that texts often need to be interpreted and that to do so one
may need linguistic skills and an awareness of the problems of translating
across time and cultures."
Interestingly, in the realm of constitutional interpretation, strict tex-
tualists and hard originalists have a lot in common with biblical literalists.
A number of scholars and judges have noted the problems inherent in strict
textualism. Except in the easiest cases-cases where the constitutional text
is not subject to more than one interpretation and where the text can be easi-
ly applied to the facts of the case in dispute-strict textualism is impossible.
Some would say it is impossible even then, but I am unwilling to go that far.
Of course there are few such cases, and many judges and scholars would
agree that in these cases looking only to the text is the best approach. In the
bulk of cases this approach is unavailable because either constitutional text
is not clear and/or because the text can not be mechanically applied to the
case at hand.
12. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 307-11.
13. Grey, supra note 1, at 5-6.
14. Cf GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 257-64, 307-11 (implying
one must already be influenced by, or be part of, the tradition in order to reach meaning
based on that tradition. Those outside the tradition may have very different preconceptions);
RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 6-11 (addressing the problems with accepting any universal prin-
ciple or concept without interpretation and the effect of preconceptions in that interpretation).
15. Grey, supra note 1, at 5-9.
16. See infra Part II.
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As a result many judges and scholars look to the intent of the framers
to help interpret the Constitution." The notion is that the intent of the fra-
mers helps an interpreter to understand the text and that it provides an ob-
jective restraint on judicial interpretatioi.'" As I have argued elsewhere, at
least in highly contested interpretive scenarios, neither of these assumptions
is accurate." In fact, at least as to the latter assumption about objectivity,
quite the opposite might be true; reliance on original intent may simply
mask judicial predispositions because the intent of the framers may be un-
knowable or divided.20 Moreover, as H. Jefferson Powell has suggested, it
is possible that the intent of the framers was not to follow the strict intent of
the framers.2'
This is particularly interesting in the context of biblical literalism. If
G-d is the author of the bible, either directly or through inspiration, how
does one know his intent? In fact, how does one know whether the text was
intended as metaphor, simply to teach lessons, or to be literally read? Is G-
d's intent not to expect humans to guess at his intent, but rather to use our
G-d given capacities to apply biblical teachings to everyday life? How can
this be done without interpretation? These are ancient theological questions
that certainly cannot be answered in this brief Essay. They demonstrate,
however, the hubris that seems to drive much dogmatic literalist interpreta-
tion, whether biblical or constitutional. Biblical literalists believe they
know what the biblical text means even if it they do not speak or understand
the language it was written in, and even if based on the text alone there are
alternative interpretations.22 Strict constitutional textualists and hard origi-
nalists share similar beliefs. They too often believe their interpretation of
the text is the correct one, even where other textual interpretations exist.23
Hard originalists believe that they can know the intent of the framers even
where that intent is not clear,24 may have varied among the framers,25 or may
have varied even within the hearts and minds of individual framers.26
Moreover, the modern interpreters did not live in the time of the framers
and may have significantly different preconceptions.27
17. ORIGINALIsM: A QUARTER-CENTURY of DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
18. Id.
19. RAVITCH,supra note 8, at 8-11.
20. Id. at 2-6, 81-82.
21. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 887-88 (1985).
22. See John Bartkowski, Beyond Biblical Literalism and Inerrancy: Conservative
Protestants and the Hermeneutic Interpretation of Scripture, 57 Soc. OF RELIGION 259, 260-
61(1996).
23. RAVITCH, supra note 8, at passim.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2-6.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2-6, 9-11, 81-82.
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In the end interpretation is inescapable. Perhaps this is the biggest
stumbling block for those who wish to engage in dogmatic textual exegesis.
Many eschew interpretation and hold tightly to notions of objectivity and
clarity, yet the best they can hope for in this regard is the production of an
illusion of clarity and objectivity.28 Underneath this illusion the same inter-
pretive questions, and the attendant metaphysical questions, remain.29
II. TAKING THE HERMENEUTIC TURN
It seems interpretation is necessary to apply core texts to real world
situations, whether those core texts be religious or a nation's core text such
as a constitution. Hermeneutics are an inescapable part of everyday life.
We are always interpreting,30 whether we know it or not. This is even more
true when one attempts to apply a text written in a different time and culture
to situations arising today."' There are many approaches to interpretation,
and many of these overlap on salient points. As I have written elsewhere,
however, philosophical hermeneutics seems especially useful in the context
of constitutional interpretation because of the time lag and cultural shifts
between the drafting of the Constitution and the present.32 For similar rea-
sons, this approach-which was clearly influenced in part by biblical her-
meneutics 3-is helpful in analyzing the interpretation of religious texts.
The philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer explained that there is no abso-
lute method of interpretation.34 Each interpreter brings his or her own pre-
conceptions into the act of interpreting a text (text can refer to more than
just a written text)." These preconceptions are influenced by the tradition,
including social context, in which the interpreter exists. 6 The interpreter's
tradition(s) provides her with a horizon that includes her interpretive predis-
positions.37 This horizon is the range of what the interpreter can see when
engaging with a text.38 The concept of dasein, or being in the world, cap-
28. See generally id.
29. Id.
30. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, atpassim.
31. RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 2-6, 81-82.
32. Id.at9-11.
33. JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 46-47 (Joel
Weinsheimer trans., Yale Univ. Press 1994) (1991).
34. This is a primary point in GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6; see
also HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 98-107 (Frederick G. Law-
rence trans., The MIT Press 1981) (1976) [hereinafter GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE].
35. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 265-71.
36. See id.; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 609, 621-22 (1990).
37. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 257-64, 358-362.
38. Id. at 302-07, 374-75.
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tures this dynamic." We exist in the world around us and that world influ-
ences how we view things.40 Thus, our traditions and context are a part of
our being.4 1 The anthropologist Clifford Geertz observed this while study-
ing other cultures.42
Still, the text has its own horizon of meaning.4 3 That horizon is influ-
enced by the context (or tradition) in which it was written, those influencing
or interpreting it over the passage of time, the words used, and the context
of the original author or authors." Philosophical hermeneutics suggests that
to understand a text, a give and take must occur between text and interpre-
ter-a dialogue between one's being and the object that one seeks to under-
stand.45 This conversation transforms both the text and interpreter as they
engage in the give and take."
The interpreter necessarily projects his or her horizon into the interpre-
tive process, but should also reflect upon it and the horizon of the text.47
The horizon of the text has a binding quality in that if the interpreter openly
enters into dialogue with the text, the horizon of the text will limit the range
of preconceptions the interpreter can project consistently with the horizon of
the text.48 Since the text and interpreter are engaged in a dialogue to reach a
common truth, neither text nor interpreter is the sole source of meaning.
Gadamer saw the quest for interpretive methodologies as interfering
with the process of interpretation by obfuscating what is really going on. It
is not that interpretive methodology is useless, but rather that it does not do
what it purports to do-reach an objective and unquestionable meaning.
The process of reaching meaning requires a constant dialogue between text
and interpreter. This dialogue is mediated, however, by tradition (I prefer
the term "context"). 49
Significantly, Gadamer does not believe that the lack of a clear inter-
pretive method prevents one from reaching truth (understanding). It simply
demonstrates that truth can be variable when different texts and interpreters
engage in the hermeneutic dialogue, or when that dialogue is engaged in
39. Id. at 257-64.
40. Id.
41. See generally id.
42. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED
ESSAYS (1973).
43. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 302-07.
44. Id. at 370, 374-75; GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 34, at 98. This may
actually be an under-inclusive list.
45. This dialogue is central to Gadamer's theory of interpretation in GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6.
46. Id. at 307.
47. Id. at 267-269.
48. See id.; Eskridge, supra note 36, at 627.
49. GADMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at 266-67, 276-77.
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over time by the same interpreter. This is not a form of relativism as some
critics have suggested.so Through a dialogue between text and interpreter
one can reach a better understanding of the text than one who does not en-
gage in such dialogue and simply assigns a reflexive meaning to the text.
Thus, while there is no methodological approach to interpretation in Gada-
merian hermeneutics, there is a way for text and interpreter to interact to
reach a meaning that is both consistent with the text and cognizant of the
role the interpreter plays in reaching that meaning.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE FAILURE OF DOGMATIC
METHODOLOGIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION
If we are embedded creatures--embedded in our traditions and con-
text-as the concept of dasein suggests, there is no Archimedean point from
which we can say that a given methodology is objective, at least in con-
tested interpretive contexts." This does not mean nihilism must reign. Af-
ter all, as Gadamer points out, the dialogue between text and interpreter can
lead to meaning, and because the interpreter must throw out preconceptions
that are inconsistent with the horizon of the text in order to fuse horizons
and interpret, it seems obvious that the interpretive possibilities are limited
to the range of what fits within both the horizon of the interpreter and the
horizon of the text.52 Legal interpreters generally use a variety of interpre-
tive modes from within the legal tradition when interpreting the Constitu-
tion." The key question is whether claims that these modes provide objec-
tive methods of interpretation are anything more than illusion.54 Similar
questions arise in the context of scriptural interpretation, but there the poss-
ible modes of interpretation may vary significantly between, and even with-
in, faiths.
This Essay is focused strictly on what I refer to as dogmatic modes of
interpretation. Thus, it is not meant as a detailed discussion of constitution-
al or scriptural hermeneutics. For present purposes, the only question is
whether biblical literalism and the combination of strict constitutional tex-
tualism and originalism have anything in common and anything useful to
offer interpreters. As noted above, they do have quite a bit in common;
although there are also significant differences." As for the second question,
the answer depends on whether one finds the solace folks might derive from
50. GRONDIN, supra note 33, at 141-42.
51. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 6, at passim.
52. See generally id
53. See PHILIP BoBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); PHILIP BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 6-8.
54. RAVITCH, supra note 8.
55. See supra Part I.
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a false sense of objectivity to be useful to interpreters. Both biblical literal-
ism and strict textualism/originalism fail to address the problem of deter-
mining intent, in the first case from the divine (either directly or through
inspiration) and in the second case from a diverse group of framers and ra-
tifiers. Moreover, these approaches fail to account for the influence of time,
culture, and tradition on the meaning of a text that must be applied in a dif-
ferent time, culture and at least partially different tradition.
The answer seems obvious. Strict biblical literalism-in the sense that
one can derive THE meaning of biblical text from the text without any in-
terpretation, and usually a translated text at that, is impossible.56 Interpreta-
tion happens, whether acknowledged or not, and human preconceptions
necessarily enter the fray." Of course, one may take on faith that such liter-
al interpretation is possible either because one is sufficiently embued with
the spirit of G-d to know what the text means or one simply has faith that
THE interpretation is correct." Such beliefs do not change the interpretive
reality, however, that unless one shares that faith the intervention of human
preconceptions and traditions in the interpretive process can not be ig-
nored."
Constitutional interpreters can not fall back on such faith arguments,
however. The job of interpreting a constitution and applying it to current
cases and issues is part of the legal and legislative traditions, and these tra-
ditions create a need for justifications beyond the assertion, "I have faith I
can channel the spirit of the framers." When the text is reasonably clear and
its application seems obvious, the traditions of legal interpretation will gen-
erally point toward a specific answer or smaller range of answers as the
interpreter engages with the text. These are commonly called the "easy
cases." Often, however, the text or its application is not so clear. I like to
call these, a bit tongue-in-cheek, "most cases." In such cases, strict textual-
ism simply does not have the tools to answer the question. Simply put, it
can not do what it sets out to accomplish, provide objective answers to
questions without relying on judicial preconceptions. As I have written
elsewhere, originalism suffers the same flaw.' In fact, originalism is doub-
ly problematic. Unless there is a clear, overarching, and uncontested sense
of the framers and ratifiers, an interpreter must be using preconceptions to
choose which intent he or she applies to a given interpretive situation.'
Even when there does seem to be clear, overarching, and uncontested
agreement among the framers and ratifiers, one must be careful in applying
56. Bartkowski, supra note 22.
57. See supra Part II.
58. Grey, supra note 1, at 5-6.
59. See supra Part II.
60. RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 2-6.
61. Id. at 2-6,9-11, 81-82.
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that intent to the modem context given the different culture, time, and tradi-
tions in which that intent existed, and the need to interpret in order to bring
that intent forward to the current case or situation.62
Like biblical literalists, strict textualists and originalists seem to have a
deep faith in the objectivity of their approaches. The ultimate question is
whether this faith is grounded in greater objectivity, given that greater ob-
jectivity and reigning in the application of judicial preconceptions seem to
be the bases for relying on strict textualism and originalism. This brief Es-
say asserts that the answer is a guarded no.
62. Id. at 2-6, 81-82.
Summer] 385
HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 385 2009
HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 386 2009
